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Proximity, sharing and choice: the constituents 
of a digital subject 
 
Human Interfaces: Borderless (Dis)Connections and Disrupted Futures 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
In this paper I hope to map out some thoughts about photography and in doing so, I intend 
to express how it offers a way to understand the terms of our own subjectivity. Which is to 
suggest that photography can be read as the interface of a changing, late-capitalist, 
subjectivity.  Of course, and probably like most of us here, I begin from a particular an 
ongoing problem. This is one that emerges as I continue to address and contend with 
photography as a subject of study at the university, and specifically, as I try to articulate to 
my students and my peers my understanding of its radical potential. When I do this I realise I 
have to reinvent something I was once familiar with. And I find myself needing new terms to 
express my understanding of what photography is.  
 
It may be useful to register and be clear about the conceptual place from where I speak 
from. For me, as part of this process of reinvention, I have approached photography, from 
both a sense of weariness and excitement. Excitement, because photography is doing so 
many interesting and new things. But weariness at how it is a subject that is often 
approached using theoretical instruments that have not been revisited for quite some time. A 
consequence of this railing against photography as it once was compared with photography 
as it now is means my critical reflection of photography begins with an articulation of a 
negation or misunderstanding of photography. 
 
Through theory, I claim this misunderstanding is, in fact, photography’s constitutive form. I 
accept this may sound counter intuitive however I remain convinced this approach opens a 
useful gap for us to intervene in reconfiguring the wider project of what photography is and 
does.  An example of how this process of misunderstanding successfully functions can be 
seen in the scene in “Four Weddings and a Funeral,” in which Hugh Grant fails to 
communicate his feelings for Andi McDowell. What is being expressed in this scene is more 
potent when Grant articulates through a structure of misunderstanding.  
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What then is the misunderstanding of photography? What is its negation? Today, when 
teaching photography, we all find ourselves confronted with a very different object of study. 
What is crucial, for me, is to define and refine its relevance in the 21st Century. I am, of 
course, absolutely certain it has one I am simply less certain how to articulate precisely what 
that is. 
 
FROM VISUAL TO PROCESSUAL: 
 
I chose then, to begin by considering how the digital age constitutes photography in a new 
condition. We can, perhaps, agree that part of this new condition incorporates thinking about 
how algorithms, data and processual information create image in a new form. In making this 
approach, we shift emphasis from visual analysis toward something processual, toward a 
system or something that speaks to non-human agency or to the “strange strangers of non-
human actors”. Of course, there is inevitably, a problem with attempting to claim 
photography is a subject that is not anything but visual. But I believe this is the structure of 
its negation.  
 
To express the same thing in a different way: my starting point is not the visual content of 
photographs, but the very form of photography. In other words, I wish to pay particular 
attention, not to what something is, but to the way it is done. I do this because I believe it is 
then possible to develop a more complex point about the constituents of a digital subject 
and, importantly, its relevance for this conference: the ontology of a new, human, digital 
subject. 
 
THE THREE FOUNDATIONAL BUT PARADOXICAL ELEMENTS: 
 
My general argument – or rather the co-ordinates on which it is built – is that, in the digital 
age, a new subject is formed that embodies three key elements: proximity, sharing and 
choice. However, I caution that these are fundamentally paradoxical forms. I describe them 
as being: a proximity replaced by the interface of the screen; a sharing that fervently 
excludes those unable or unwilling to participate; and an excess of choice but an inability to 
choose. It is, of course, no coincidence that these are qualities, not only of the digital 
subject, but also of photography. 
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Proximity: 
Today, photography appears to offer a way to close down distances. While we can 
communicate instantly, sending images of where we are and what we are doing, from right 
here right now to right there right now, inevitably the physical distance that separates us is 
replaced by the interface of the screen. A consequence of which is that all contact, near or 
far, appears to be mediated and replaced by this very same screen.   
 
Sharing: 
In the context of digital environments such as Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram, sharing 
photographs is a common place activity. However, sharing is not necessarily an inclusive 
activity. Rather it forcefully excludes those who are not followers or friends, favouring those 
who interact by liking, swiping right, commenting, retweeting or sharing.  
 
Choice: 
With so many photographs available online, it is not unreasonable to question why we might 
need to take any photographs at all. Should we decide to make our own images, the 
seemingly excess of choice becomes a constraining force advocating we take only certain 
familiar and standard types of images that conform to the choices of images we have 
already seen before. It is as though given more choice of image we are faced with the 
impossibility of being able to chose what images to make unless, of course, they conform to 
the standardised form we have already seen before. The unending possibilities of image 
seems to have exposed its opposite: a limited set of standard and familiar image formulas 
and types.  
 
Digital photographic determination, I argue, rests on the triadic logic of these seemingly 
contradictory positions. Through these elements a digital photograph appears elaborated in 
a way that enacts the movement of ‘absolute recoil,’ wherein its determination is mediated 
and structured by itself. Photography is mediated not by its opposite – as we might 
understand identity through difference or essence through appearance. In this sense 
photography is defined as such, not because it is neither painting nor movies, instead, 
photography is its own epistemic obstacle. I suggest a way of proceeding is by looking at 
how we think about photography otherwise.     
 
WHAT IS THE CURRENT POSITION OR DICHOTOMY? 
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If I may, for a moment, elevate to the altitude of critical theory. What are the general 
theoretical positions? Levi Bryant’s, (The Democracy of Objects, 2011 p.247) outlines two 
positions or cultures of thinking:  
 
One has “a focus on lived experience, text, discourse, signifiers, signs, representation, and 
meaning.” This is the phenomenological field. What we experience are things onto which we 
project intentions, meanings, signs and discourses. This approach being one that is largely 
familiar to those who studied photographic theory in the 80s. 
 
“This is a form of inquiry dominated by figures such as the various phenomenologists, 
Derrida, Lacan, Žižek, and Foucault, for example. Here there is very little in the way of a 
discussion of the role played by nonhuman actors in collectives involving human beings. 
Rather, nonhuman entities are treated as screens upon which humans project their 
intentions, meanings, signs, and discourses, rather than as genuine actors in their own right. 
They are instead passive matter awaiting formatting by humans.” (Ibid) 
 
While the other culture “pays careful attention to the differences contributed by nonhuman 
agencies such as technologies, animals, environments, and so on.” This is the domain of the 
new materialists, or vital materialists or the thinking of object orientated ontologies. 
 
“humans are not at the center of being, but are among beings,” and “objects are not a pole 
opposing a subject, but exist in their own right, regardless of whether any other object or 
human relates to them. Humans, far from constituting a category called “subject” that is 
opposed to “object”, are themselves one type of object among many” (Ibid, 249). 
 
In “The Democracy of Objects” (2011), Bryant borrows from and builds upon DeLanda’s 
term of a flat ontology, in which there are no ontological privileged agents that can totalise 
reality. Bryant’s “flat ontology” seeks to reconcile these two positions. “an ontology capable 
of doing justice to these strange nonhuman actors, capable of respecting these strange 
strangers on their own terms, and an ontology capable of doing justice to the 
phenomenological and the semiotic” (Ibid: 248). 
 
And within this flattened ontology, human subjects are just one in a series of disparate 
objects.  Bryant develops four positions toward this flattened ontology: 
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Firstly, that no objects have full presence or actuality. 
 
Second, that the world does not exist – there is no “super object” or totality that gathers 
everything together in harmonious unity. What is meant here is that the world isn’t one 
container into which objects are placed. It’s not the super object that is comprised of all the 
other objects in it.   
 
Thirdly, that humans occupy no privileged place within being. We are left with differences in 
degree rather than difference in kind.  
 
Finally, all objects are on an ontologically equal footing. In this regard, technologies, 
institutions, fictions are just as real as planets, trees and oceans. Thus we are invited to 
think in terms of differing temporal and spatial experience and to consider entanglements 
and collective forms, rather than the usual human and object dichotomy.  
 
“. . . to diminish an almost exclusive focus on propositions, representations, norms, signs, 
narratives, discourses, and so on, so as to cultivate a greater appreciation for nonhuman 
actors such as animate and inanimate natural entities, technologies, and such.” 
 
MAN WITH A MOVIE CAMERA: 
 
Along similar lines, Jacques Rancière argued that “Man with a Movie Camera” is an example 
of the practice of ‘cinematic communism.’ It presents a multiplicity of life forms in everyday 
life. In the film we see everyday activities: washing hair; speaking on the phone; unplugging 
cables. According to Rancière, what makes this cinematic practice communist is that what 
we are shown, all these displayed activities, are equalised and entangled. He (Rancière) 
claims, they present an assertion of the radical universality of being. Such that the usual 
hierarchies and oppositions are suspended and as such there is an apparent harmony of 
being. I believe its possible to extend Rancière’s position to the point where image as a 
structuring force creates apparent universality. In this way, the everyday activities presented 
in “Man with a Movie Camera” are the forerunners of YouTube videos of people doing 
everyday things, such as ‘unboxing’ or chores like cleaning their cars. 
 
WHAT IS THIS NEW SUBJECTIVITY?  
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My argument is that photography represents a form of symbolic dematerialised labour, one 
that is common to late-capitalism. It may even be possible to go as far as saying, it is the 
most significant form of labour in this epoch. Situated and circulated, most obviously, within 
the horizontal social networks of the Internet, and emerging through advances in associated 
technology, photography embodies something of how Marx described the ‘general intellect.’ 
In wider terms, relating to its production, it anticipates a new subjectivity. 
 
In Grundrisse, Marx expresses how the material mechanism of industrial production 
expresses the relationship of capitalist domination, wherein the worker is a mere supplement 
to the machinery owned by the capitalist. The same can also be said of the digital subject 
who inhabits the Internet, such that the particularity of social positions are seemingly 
eradicated. Similarly, the power relations of the Internet are also obfuscated by the notion of 
it being some form of collective, neutral, self-regulating and self-organising system.     
The ceaseless rendering of experience as photographic image has served the transition 
from industrial age to information age. It has done so by reconfiguring a modernist mode of 
production into the phrases of networked and interlinked expressions. I claim, the basic 
Marxist concept of a proletarian subject and of exploitation require rethinking. Clearly, the 
strict notion of surplus value – wherein labour is measured by time – no longer fits our 
capitalist model. Even Marx was aware that as knowledge becomes central to wealth 
production the classical logic of exploitation no longer works.  
 
Big technology companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, own our ‘general 
intellect,’ they control the symbolic substance of society, our very means of communication. 
Today, in order for us to communicate with one another we have to pay rent to these 
organisations. It is therefore a different model of making money; this is very different from 
appropriating extra profit. In the economy of ‘everyday’ photographic images, it seems we 
can consider exchange as being the formal determinant of a distracting means of re-
production. Instead of mustering resistance to the inequalities permeating the social order 
we resist confrontation by imaging and imagining the world. In a time of crisis, with regard to 
critical, new and workable ideas, along with the social shifts that lead away from confronting 
economic, environmental and political consequences, the obsession with and production of 
an excess of images expresses a fundamental failure of our vision and signifies a blind spot 
in awareness.  
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In this formulation, photographic images offer the means to face, not the world itself, but an 
alternative, already formed and particular image of the world. This is an image that is not 
structured by any correspondence with a real or visual truth or any documentary claim. 
Rather, it is one emerging from and through the notions of proximity, sharing and choice. 
These are the critical components of ‘everyday’ photographic production. 
 
A further point for consideration is concerned with how photography is a process that is 
becoming more and more technically sophisticated yet our experience is not a seamless 
rendering of the world, in which image and reality are indistinguishable. Rather, what 
becomes more apparent is the gap between the symbolic surface and reality.  
 
Photographs do not appear to render the world more precisely and accurately. Which is to 
suggest that a faithful experience is depends as much on what is implied is as what is 
stated. Thus the excessive qualities of image are of the same order as the information 
overload that provokes a kind of paralysis of choice.   
 
The relative narrowness of the mediated forms of image – such as Instagram, Facebook, 
Snapchat etc. – are able to penetrate our interior worlds in ways that reality itself fails. When 
confronted by experience that is other than image, we immediately become positioned at an 
ordinary, normal, distance. The movement here is from an ethereal presence to a brutal 
immediacy. Furthermore, the trauma we experience when moving from mediated image to 
reality is not caused some form of desublimation. Experience is not a void that gets filled by 
the real. Instead, the digital environment of digital images is over-present, part of a 
continuous and friction free flow of image after image. Ultimately, what this removes is the 
sense of power relations and social antagonisms that are part of the economy of exchange.       
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
Photography can be used as way to articulate the distancing of proximity, it can express the 
exclusive nature of sharing and it can embody the paralysis of too much choice.  
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Perhaps we can begin by recalling the image of the analyst of the patient. In this there is 
nothing more than the impossibility of intersubjectivity. They are not actually in dialogue with 
one another. Instead we are together in attempt to not understand one another. We are 
therefore all looking out toward something in a kind of solidarity (from “The community of 
those with nothing in common” (Alphonso Lingis, 1994)). The essential quality of being in 
communication with someone who is dying wherein what you say can really make no 
difference and the prospect of intersubectivity, of communication is often built at the 
moments of its greatest failure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
